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Judicial Administration-The Human Factors 
Howard T. Markey* 
I t  is tough enough for a judge to "do" justice in every case. 
Yet a judge is also expected by many to "administer" justice, to 
"manage" his or her caseload and calendar, to "take charge" 
early, often, and with thoroughness in every civil case. In that 
view, regardless of whatever staff and machine aids may be pro- 
vided, the judge cannot escape the central role in what is rightly 
called judicial administration-a role and responsibility that 
comes with the territory. Delegation of individual chores may 
save time, but the ultimate responsibility of seeing that justice is 
administered correctly and in accordance with law is and must 
remain fixed upon the one considered the central actor in the 
drama-the judge. Although these statements may be widely 
viewed as truisms that are centuries old in their fundamentals, 
the modern flood of civil litigation highlights the need for their 
careful, contemplative consideration by every judge. 
It is easy to write articles about the administrative responsi- 
bilities of judges. It is another thing for trial judges, operating 
on the battle's front line and confronted with an avalanche of 
civil litigation, to meet those responsibilities in a varied and 
monstrous milieu of other duties. 
Much is available in the way of tools and "how to" knowl- 
edge, including the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. There is 
also a growing intellectual acceptance of the need for judges to 
take charge. This need has been prompted by widely lamented 
horror stories about pretrial abuses such as delay, harassment, 
unending interrogatories and evasive answers, extended and nu- 
merous depositions, and proliferating motions and supporting 
papers-all of which contribute to outrageous costs. There is 
enough blame to go around, and a good share of it is attributable 
to discovery-abusing lawyers who fail to balance their duty to a 
client with their duty as officers of the court. More and more, 
however, those concerned with the condition of the American 
* Chief Judge, United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. 
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justice system have recognized that one of the major stumbling 
blocks to improvement is the administratively passive judge. 
If the know-how, the tools, and the intellectual acceptance 
of the need for judges to assume case-management responsibili- 
ties exist, whence the complaint about passive judges? Why does 
it appear that among our major tamers of system-abusing law- 
yers-our judges-there may be some who do not exercise that 
responsibility? Why doesn't every judge conduct repeated, 
scheduled, thorough pretrial conferences in chambers in every 
case, ruling on almost all pretrial matters at the conference, set- 
ting dgtes of the next pretrial conference and for trial, dictating 
a short memo on those rulings and dates, and announcing the 
judge's ready availability for a conference at any time requested 
by the lawyers?' This procedure has been described as the sim- 
plest, quickest, and most efficient way for judges to exercise 
their management responsibility. It is done by most if not all of 
our most experienced and respected judges. That it is not uni- 
versally being done may be a phenomenon caused by certain 
human factors. 
As humans, judges are certainly subject to all the tempta- 
tions and frailties of the race. Temptations to succumb to lazi- 
ness, arrogance, pride, or similar shortcomings, or to overempha- 
size popularity with the bar, are ever present. Nevertheless, the 
vast majority of judges have successfully avoided those pitfalls; 
their record, both historically and currently, confirms an out- 
standing performance of judicial duties. 
Judges have been dedicated from the time they donned 
their robes to a desire that haunts their dreams-a desire to de- 
cide every case correctly and fairly, to do justice in every case. 
This essay looks at some human factors in judicial administra- 
tion which make the fulfillment of that dream at times elusive. 
This is not an attempt at remote psychoanalysis of judges. The 
human factors of concern here, those that appear to contribute 
to judicial passivity, are more in the nature of long and uncriti- 
cally accepted ideas and subconscious notions. 
Among the possible causal factors for a passive judicial ap- 
proach to pre-trial case management are (1) the idea that coun- 
sel have the right to conduct their cases, (2) a subconscious fear 
1. There may well be other ways of carrying out the duty of case management. For 
example, Judge Thomas Lambros of the Northern District of Ohio has initiated a "sum- 
mary jury trial" process. 
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of judicial embarrassment, (3) the reluctance to step into all 
cases when "ninety percent will be settled anyway," (4) the press 
of other duties, and (5) an over-readiness to surrender to 
problems created by the geographical remoteness of counsel. 
That counsel have a right to conduct their trials is unques- 
tioned. Judges should limit interjections from the bench in all 
trials, and particularly in jury trials, to instances of necessity. 
But no basis exists for transferring all of the same considera- 
tions to the period before trial. The public has an interest, a 
vital interest, in that period. The public has a right to pretrial 
periods that neither extend a day longer, nor cost a dollar more, 
than necessary. 
The moment a complaint is filed, i.e., the moment a citizen 
elects to employ the judicial process to achieve his ends, his case 
becomes the public's business. The public pays for the function- 
ing of the judicial process, and often pays for corporate litigation 
costs through increased prices. Beyond monetary considerations, 
the public is severely injured when deprived of the efficient ad- 
ministration of justice. Such deprivation, if widespread and long 
continued, could become the death knell of a free society. 
There is no necessary conflict between efficiency and justice. 
On the contrary, "inefficient justice" may be a contradiction in 
terms. Nowhere is it ordained that due process must be sloppy 
process. 
Because all matters preliminary to trial affect the adminis- 
tration of justice, those matters cannot be the private fiefdom of 
the lawyers, to do with as they wish. Every case must be man- 
aged in the public interest, and in many cases the only one who 
can perform that management job is the judge. 
Part of the reason for the existence of a rights-of-counsel 
syndrome may lie in the laudable judicial desire to remain above 
the fray, to maintain a clear and true image of objective imparti- 
ality. Maintenance of that image may appear easier for the judge 
who manages passively rather than actively. Yet the choice is 
not Draconian. There is no real conflict between the necessity to 
be and appear indifferent to the outcome on the one hand and 
refusal to be indifferent to abuses of the judicial process on the 
other hand. The choice need not be between an appearance of 
favoritism and a turning of the judicial back on pretrial abuses. 
Active, vigorous enforcement of the Marquess of Queensbury 
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Rules is imperative to a fair bout, not an indication of favoritism 
toward either boxer. Indeed, in managing the pretrial period, the 
passive can paralyze and only the firm can be fair. 
Lawyers can become mesmerized by the ancient injunction, 
"The client's interest is paramount," if they fail to ask the obvi- 
ous question, "Compared to what?" Certainly the client's inter- 
est is paramount to that of the lawyer, but is it paramount in all 
cases to the public interest in the efficient and just conduct of 
the judicial process? Those mesmerized lawyers who view the 
law as a sport, who operate on a winning-is-the-only-thing the- 
ory, can be expected to engage in all of the dilatory, harassing, 
and expense- and fee-generating tactics available under the dis- 
covery rules. Those lawyers prefer a passive performance from 
the bench. Disdaining the natural desire for popularity, demand- 
ing instead respect for the judicial process, the judge, and only 
the judge, is positioned and empowered to control and channel 
those tactics toward prompt, just, and less costly resolution of 
the dispute. Non-mesmerized lawyers, who give the judicial pro- 
cess at least equal billing with the client's interest, and who give 
thought to their roles as officers of the court, may make the 
judge's management job easier, but the job remains that of the 
judge in every case. 
If the black mark on the administration of justice repre- 
sented by abuses in pre-trial activities is to be removed, the 
right of counsel to conduct their cases must, when necessary, 
give way to the duty of the judge to administer justice. 
That judges don't know all the law is another truism 
honored more in repose than in recognition. 
Some inexperienced lawyers may think judges know it all, 
but many lawyers, including the experienced who know better, 
pretend that judges know it all. Presented day after day with 
that apparent belief of counsel, often expressed in admiring, 
even cloying, phrases, judges are subjected to a subtle pressure 
to join the charade. They are surrounded with the important 
and necessary trappings that belong to justice (not to the judge, 
to whom they are merely loaned), including the title, the robe, 
the raised bench, and the required respect. A judge is thus con- 
stantly and properly reminded of the prestige and importance of 
his or her office. Even among judges who remember that they 
were appointed, not anointed, it is an easy step from mainte- 
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nance of a well-founded image of integrity and impartiality to a 
subliminal acceptance of a false image of omniscience. 
A judge actively managing each case from its filing date will 
be denying discovery in certain areas, vacating certain interroga- 
tories, limiting evidence and issues, and ruling on various mo- 
tions. Fair disposition of many of those matters will require 
some knowledge of the law involved in the case. A judge whose 
law practice had been limited to probate, for example, may fear 
that active engagement in repeated pretrial conferences involv- 
ing other legal fields would undercut the judicial image, because 
the lawyers would detect the judge's limited knowledge. Unlike 
the medical intern, who would not think (or be permitted) to 
attempt brain surgery, the judge who is new or inexperienced in 
a particular field of law feels compelled to try every case as- 
signed, however complex it may be. Unwilling or unable to see 
the case transferred to a more experienced judge, he or she 
struggles through. Concerned not so much with personal embar- 
rassment as embarrassment of the office, the judge's "solution," 
in far too many instances, has been to require everything in 
writing, to study the writings, and to then issue an order, resolv- 
ing doubts in favor of "letting it in for what it's worth." But that 
approach, with its delays, mounds of paper, and consumption of 
judicial time, is part of the problem, not the solution. 
The solution to the embarrassment problem lies in those 
three magic words of judicial salvation: "I don't know." The wise 
judge knows that the greater embarrassment, albeit unspoken, 
redounds upon the office when a judge feigns a non-existent 
knowledge. The wise judge knows that it is neither required nor 
possible for all judges to know all the law. The wise judge also 
knows that most lawyers study the judge and are fully aware of 
the true state of affairs. Most lawyers will welcome a judge's 
candid admission of limited experience and knowledge in the 
law of the case, and the judge will be made happier by the 
welcoming. 
There is no danger in the judge's saying, "I don't know," for 
those words will be quickly followed by, "So educate me, as you 
are being paid to do. Let's get on with it, here and now." After 
all, legal advocacy, whether in chambers or in court, is definable 
as an effort to so educate a decisionmaker as to produce a 
favorable decision. Concerning pretrial activities, a judge may 
need to learn only so much of the involved law as may be needed 
to fairly decide the specific pretrial issues presented. Yet, if pre- 
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trial activities are to be controlled at all, that much of the law 
must be learned. The only question is whether it is to be learned 
face-to-face in a pretrial conference, or more slowly and labori- 
ously from reams of papers studied in chambers. 
There will be some motions and other pretrial matters that 
may absolutely require the filing of affidavits, briefs, and memo- 
randa. But most, if not all, of those that would constitute an 
abuse of the judicial process can be identified and eliminated at 
a pretrial conference. To do that often requires some judicial 
knowledge of the involved law, but that knowledge can and 
should be gained from the lawyers in conference by a candid and 
unembarrassed judge. 
With 187,000 cases filed last year in the courts of some 500 
federal district judges, and the number of filings increasing 
yearly, it is at least a surface blessing that about ninety percent 
are settled before trial. In each year of the past decade, an es- 
sentially fixed number of federal district judges tried more cases 
than the previous year, with trials numbering over 20,000 last 
year. Considering all of the nontrial duties imposed on judges, 
that is a tremendous accomplishment. It is understandable that 
a judge importuned to conduct pretrial conferences in every case 
should ask for reasons for doing so when most will be settled 
anyway* 
There are a number of reasons for conducting pretrial con- 
ferences despite the high settlement percentages. First, without 
early and frequent pretrial conferences it cannot be known how 
many cases were ultimately settled solely because of unneces- 
sary, process-abusing delays and expense. Elimination of inap- 
propriate settlements forced by the ability of a lawyer "to tie 
you up in court for ten years" is devoutly to be desired. A 
judge's active conduct of pretrial conferences, beginning 
promptly after filing, can unearth and preclude potential injus- 
tices in such cases. 
Secondly, far too many otherwise appropriate settlements 
occur far too late in the process. Obviously, a party expecting to 
lose at trial (particularly if the money owed is daily earning 
more interest than the court is permitted to award) loses noth- 
ing (and may gain) by delay. Moreover, parties intending to set- 
tle are sorely tempted to employ pretrial maneuvers as tools to 
encourage a more favorable settlement on the eve of trial. Early 
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and frequently scheduled pretrial conferences, aiming at early 
and established trial dates, can result not only in more settle- 
ments, but, equally important, in much earlier settlements. 
Every case settled reduces the number of pending cases, but 
settlement after a first or second early conference removes a case 
which would have otherwise remained on the pending case back- 
log for three to five years. In virtually every crowded docket of 
pending cases lies a large number that would be settled in two 
weeks if an actively managing, fair-and-impartial-but-no-non- 
sense judge were to announce a pretrial conference at  which a 
firm trial date would be set. 
In one such instance, a collection of ten separate cases in- 
volving a particular legal specialty had been pending for from 
four to six years. No two of the ten cases involved the same par- 
ties or lawyers. When a judge committed to case management 
was assigned and promptly scheduled pretrial conferences, five 
cases were immediately settled by stipulation without a confer- 
ence and three were settled at  the first conference. The remain- 
ing two were tried on the same day, after pretrial conferences 
had reduced and clarified the evidence and the issues. The en- 
tire process consumed only five hours of judicial time in confer- 
ences and one day of trial time. The judge, educated at  the con- 
ferences and at trial, rendered judgments with opinions within a 
week after trial. The entire process, from assignment of the ten 
cases to the judge to their final disposition, took less than six 
weeks. Not all sets of backlogged cases would fit that scenario, 
but none will even approach it if judges passively disregard the 
opportunities for earlier settlements and reductions in trial time 
inherent in a universal pretrial system. 
Thus, a recognition that many cases will be settled does not 
argue for judicial passivity; it highlights the opportunity for ju- 
dicial management of the pretrial period. It dramatizes the 
chance for avoiding unfair settlements, achieving fair settle- 
ments earlier, and reducing both trial and decisionmaking time. 
IV. OTHER DUTIES 
Contrary to public perception, judges have many duties be- 
yond presiding at trial. The hectic schedule of today's trial judge 
includes numerous nontrial proceedings in court, such as ar- 
raignments, sentencing, and argument of motions. It includes 
numerous in-chambers matters, such as conducting in camera 
proceedings, researching the law, writing opinions, and manag- 
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ing a personal staff. It includes out-of-chambers matters, such as 
attendance at committee meetings with other judges and court 
administrators. Though not exhaustive, that list renders under- 
standable a judge's hesitancy in accepting the suggestion that 
pretrial conferences be conducted in every case. 
It should be pointed out, however, that judicial management 
through pretrial conferences in every case actually reduces the 
total workload of the judge. The work of deciding whether cer- 
tain interrogatories must be answered, whether certain failures 
to admit are justified, or whether a certain deposition should be 
ordered must be done. The active conference system of judicial 
management involves the same judicial chores as a passive 
paperwork system; it just enables the judge to accomplish those 
chores in less time. It is in most cases easier, and infinitely 
quicker, to decide a pretrial question in conference, after oppos- 
ing counsel state their positions, than it is to decide that same 
question after weeks or months of briefs and memoranda, an- 
swering briefs and memoranda, and reply briefs and memo- 
randa, all of which must be read and digested. I t  is infinitely 
more efficient to require that motions first be made orally at a 
conference, and that only those found incapable of decision at 
conference be granted a briefing schedule. 
The workload reduction does not stop there. As indicated 
above, pretrial conferences can lead to earlier settlement. Where 
settlement is not reached, early and frequent pretrial confer- 
ences can so reduce and clarify the issues as to eliminate days or 
weeks of unnecessary trial time. Finally, such conferences can so 
reduce the size and complexity of the record as to facilitate the 
judge's post-trial decisionmaking. 
When asked why they conduct pretrial conferences early 
and often in every case, experienced judges have responded: 
"Because I can't afford not to," and "Because I haven't time to 
do it any other way." 
It is true that the judge-manager must fit into a busy sched- 
ule the time necessary for pretrial conferences. The scheduling 
will vary from judge to judge. Some might schedule one hour 
every day for that purpose; some might set up a two-hour period 
on Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays; some might devote one 
full day a week. For maximum benefit, every schedule should 
include a flexibility feature whereby the judge is available at al- 
most any time to meet in chambers with the lawyers at their 
request. 
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A formerly passive judge undertaking an active manage- 
ment role will require time to convince the bar that he or she 
means business and means to eliminate abuses of pretrial 
processes in his or her court. Once so convinced, the lawyers will 
find it both comforting and in their interest to contribute to that 
goal. Thereafter, with a reduced backlog and cooperating coun- 
sel, the judge's management chore will be greatly eased. Once it 
gets rolling, a pretrial conference system of case management 
makes the judge's overall job easier, not harder. 
To the judge hesitant about adding to a busy schedule a 
system of conferences in every case, the predictably safe assur- 
ance might be, "Try it-you'll like it!" 
It is easy to visualize frequent conferences of judge and 
counsel in a large metropolitan area, where the courthouse may 
be a short walk from the principal lawyers' offices. In less popu- 
lated areas, or when principal counsel are based outside a metro- 
politan area, the courthouse may be hundreds of miles from the 
principal lawyers' offices. Although that circumstance may re- 
quire special steps to facilitate a judge's responsibility for case 
management, it is not a reason to disregard that responsibility. 
The local rules of every federal district court require an ap- 
pearance of local counsel. Local counsel may come to a noticed 
pretrial conference prepared to discuss the case, the pending dis- 
covery problems, the evidence, the basic issues, and the poten- 
tial for settlement. If an area is uncovered in which local counsel 
require instructions from lead or principal counsel, the confer- 
ence may be adjourned for receipt of those instructions. The ad- 
journment may last only long enough to complete a phone call or 
only for a few days, depending on the issue involved. It is recog- 
nized that a desire to avoid increased client costs has often led 
to engagement of local counsel only to watch the calendar and 
s h d e  papers. Nonetheless, it should be possible in many cases 
to involve only local counsel in at least the earliest pretrial con- 
ferences and in those devoted to relatively simple pretrial ques- 
tions. In those instances in which local counsel's fee for educa- 
tion on the case and participation in the conference is 
substantially less than the combined cost of principal counsel's 
travel and participation fee, involvement of local counsel alone 
in a pretrial conference would appear to reduce client costs. In 
any event, the important thing is the conference and the rulings 
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made there to advance the administration of justice. 
When participation by principal counsel is required in a 
pretrial conference, and the cost of travel is unwarranted, a con- 
ference call can be arranged. With or without local counsel pre- 
sent, a judge can conduct a pretrial conference with both princi- 
pal counsel on the phone almost as well as when talking face-to- 
face with them. Chief Judge Jack Weinstein of the Eastern Dis- 
trict of New York has announced that judges of that court will 
hear motions and other applications by telephone, and has au- 
thorized the taking of testimony by closed-circuit television. 
Someday, closed-circuit television or "phonevision" may permit 
face-to-face pretrial conference with the judge in Omaha cham- 
bers and opposing counsel in their respective Los Angeles and 
New York offices. Indeed, the need for overcoming the cancerous 
growth of pretrial abuses would appear to warrant investigation 
right now of what such electronic pretrial conferences might cost 
and a comparison of those costs with all of the costs generated 
by present abuses. 
Geographical remoteness of principal counsel does represent 
an obstacle to judicial case management through conferences. By 
employing desire, ingenuity, and modern communications sys- 
tems, however, judges can overcome that obstacle to the efficient 
administration of justice. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Judicial administration entails, and the public interest re- 
quires, fair and impartial management by the judge of all pre- 
trial events. Frequent conferences with counsel constitute a ma- 
jor management mechanism. Human factors, such as the idea 
that counsel have a right to conduct their cases, judicial fear of 
displaying limited knowledge of the law involved, reluctance to 
deal with cases likely to be settled, judicial concern for other 
duties, and an overemphasis on geographical remoteness of prin- 
cipal counsel may contribute to passivity about pretrial events 
on the part of some judges. If so, those judges may wish to con- 
sider whether the public interest, the value of candor, the en- 
couragement of earlier settlements, and the reduction of overall 
workload are goals sufficient to overcome human factors that can 
serve as obstacles to the administration of justice. 
